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Everything Is Not o' Kay
10/03/2003

Personally, reading the portion of David Kay's Iraq-WMD report that is available to the public, I'm entering the phase of complete disbelief that there are people still insisting that an attack was unjustified. Even without seeing questionable motives behind the utter disappearance of mainstream-press analysis of the Iraq–al Qaeda link (see here, and here, and here for some non-mainstream confirmation of the link), it seems to me that the "No WMD!" cry is less justified as time goes on, despite the assertions of those who think the absence of them is a settled matter.

From Kay's report, this passage snapped my memory back to the pre-war argument:

They have told ISG that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future point. Some indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of sanctions. At least one senior Iraqi official believed that by 2000 Saddam had run out of patience with waiting for sanctions to end and wanted to restart the nuclear program.

Across the WMD spectrum, the clear implication is that the programs were at least operating sufficiently to maintain the ability to rush back toward research and production once sanctions were lifted. Before war became a real possibility, sanctions were the discussion — with those who later became anti-war calling for them to be lifted. As war became the object of argument, it wasn't a question of imminence, but prevention of imminence; in fact, the more-common word was "preemption." As Jay Nordlinger reminds us, in the President's pre-war State of the Union, the question was put this way:

Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations will come too late.

On the question of whether Just War required "imminence," I wrote:

One can act in defense despite a lack of absolute knowledge that an attacker will, indeed, swing his sword a fourth time. On the other end, it would stretch the bounds of expectation to attack France (as gratifying as that might be) on the basis that it is working toward a "second superpower" Europe that might one day attack the United States. (Just War also covers this loophole through the "every other means" requirement.) The point is that, even when dealing with events that have not happened, judgment is possible. In my judgment, claims that the war in Iraq is unique in being a "preemptive war" are errant, if coming from those who support it, and disingenuous, coming from those who oppose.

Upholding her job requirement to criticize the administration whatever the case, Democrat Nancy Pelosi stated the essence of the pre-war anti-war argument, which is now replaced with whatever looks most damaging to the President on a given day: "there was time for more diplomatic effort before we went to war." There most definitely was not. What more could have been done? More inspections? Then what? Well, that answer is clear: more idle threats if Saddam failed to cooperate (rather, continued to fail to cooperate) and removal of sanctions if he managed a clean bill of health.

For my part, between the WMD evidence, the al Qaeda link, and the undeniable horror from which the Iraqi people have been freed, I'm convinced that we've already got enough information to declare the war justified. But there's certainly promise for more.

Before the war, I reached a point at which I could no longer take objections seriously. We're approaching that point post-war, now.

Posted by Justin Katz @ 02:16 PM EST